Levantine states most prepared should seek Gulf recognition of equivalence in their systems, product by product, rather than wait for a consensus that will never come. When GCC countries tighten requirements on food safety, certificates of origin, and product traceability, the usual response in Levantine capitals is to complain about cost and demand facilitation. That response misses the point. The Gulf market does not need courtesy; it needs proof. My thesis is that “mutual recognition” between the Levant and the Gulf is premature, and the realistic path is for a small coalition of the most ready states to request Gulf recognition of equivalence in specific commodities, on a shared Levantine verification platform that later expands to those meeting its conditions.
The Gulf imports most of its food, and re‑exports part of it through logistics hubs to markets with their own standards. Regulatory authorities accountable to their consumers cannot afford presumed trust. In April 2021, Saudi Arabia suspended imports of Lebanese fruits and vegetables after narcotics were found hidden in pomegranates. As Riyadh stated, the problem was not the fruit’s quality but the collapse of trust in the inspection and traceability system—costing every Lebanese farmer. This does not exclude protectionism; the dividing line is the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS): any requirement beyond Codex Alimentarius standards must be risk‑based and non‑discriminatory. Suspicion arises when a condition is imposed on imports but waived for domestic producers, or when it changes suddenly without scientific justification. Below that threshold, the matter is technical, not political.
Mutual recognition presupposes equivalence between accredited laboratories, inspection and traceability systems, and enforcement bodies capable of sanctioning. That equivalence does not exist today, and disparities within the Levant are wide: Jordan’s institutions are established and assessable; Lebanon suffers institutional erosion; Syria is rebuilding; Palestinian exports remain hostage to occupation‑controlled crossings. Moreover, Jordan alone among the four is a WTO member, meaning SPS Article 4’s principle of equivalence does not legally bind the Gulf toward the other three. Why should the Gulf accept? Because recognition of equivalence, if well‑designed, serves its interests: lowering border testing costs, diversifying nearby land‑based supply sources, while retaining the right to audit and suspend. What is needed, then, is not mutual recognition between equals, but Gulf recognition—subject to review—that a specific Levantine system achieves the same level of protection. Waiting for Levantine consensus effectively hands the pace to the least prepared system, while success by one state creates a model for others to measure against.
The proposal rests on existing references, not new texts: SPS Article 4, Codex guidelines on judging equivalence of sanitary measures tied to inspection and certification systems (CAC/GL 53‑2003), and international mutual recognition agreements among accreditation bodies—bearing in mind that the Gulf Accreditation Center is signatory to the ILAC mutual recognition arrangement. The framework would be established by protocol among participating states within the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, linked to the Arab Food Security Strategy adopted at the Baghdad Summit in May 2025. Technically, it would rest on four pillars: internationally accredited laboratories whose results are accepted without re‑testing; a shared digital registry linking each shipment to its farm and aggregator; pesticide residue limits harmonized with Gulf standards; and a digital certificate of origin resistant to forgery. Governance would be handled by a small technical secretariat and a joint council including Gulf regulators. Disputes would be resolved through joint audits within a set timeframe, with a core rule: suspend the non‑compliant exporter or shipment, not ban an entire country.
Collective certification through cooperatives and aggregators lowers individual costs, but collapses if internal oversight is absent—one member’s violation discredits the whole group and enables aggregator price dominance. Risk‑based inspection rewards a clean record but penalizes new exporters lacking history. Sharing costs among the state, donors, and importers is essential at the outset, but becomes dependency unless tied to a phased reduction schedule. Digital registries require connectivity and trust in the data‑holding authority. Pre‑approved export corridors speed clearance but naturally favor large exporters near borders. These tools succeed only in combination, and only if each corridor reserves space for aggregators serving small producers.
Phase one, within a year, sees Levantine states—or some of them—self‑assess their systems under Codex guidelines in two or three commodities with steady Gulf demand, with Gulf regulators involved from day one. Phase two launches a pilot corridor with one Gulf state for one commodity, with full audit rights for the importer. Phase three expands the framework by product and geography, opening to other Levantine states once they meet the same standards—not before.
The first tangible step needs no summit: the Minister of Agriculture, in partnership with the Food and Drug Administration, should submit a formal request to Saudi Arabia’s Food and Drug Authority—Saudi Arabia being the largest neighboring Gulf market by land—for joint evaluation of equivalence in fresh fruit and vegetable systems, with the Gulf Standards Organization involved. The Arab League Secretariat should adopt this path within implementation of the Arab Food Security Strategy. Trust is not won by ministerial statements; it is built by systems that withstand scrutiny.