Some describe the current crisis as a “existential threat” to Arab food security. Dr. Fadel ELZUBI, advisor and international expert in food security, food systems transformation, rural development, and post-crisis recovery, considers this characterization “exaggerated at present.” Yet he stresses that multiple indicators confirm the region is facing mounting pressures on food security—both in terms of availability and affordability.

Data show that more than two-thirds of Arab countries suffer poverty rates exceeding 35%, the group most vulnerable to food price inflation, which now surpasses general inflation in 54% of the region’s states, according to the World Bank’s “Response to Rising Food Insecurity.”

Gulf countries import 80–90% of their food needs, with 70% of these imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Estimates indicate that strategic reserves in the UAE and Saudi Arabia cover 4–6 months, but as the war drags on, fears of “empty shelves” have begun to surface. ELZUBI comments: “Global standards set strategic reserves at 4–6 months, but Gulf states exceed this, with more than 12 months of wheat. Jordan holds about 15 months of wheat, while other staples range between 3–4 months. Still, the risk remains if these reserves are targeted militarily or through cyberattacks, as happened in Mosul in 2014 or in the recent attempted hack of Jordan’s grain silos.” He reminds that the absence of domestic production in the Gulf makes them wholly dependent on imports. Despite closures of main routes, “alternatives exist via Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Red Sea ports. This does not mean collapse, but it does impose institutional strain that varies by country, depending on reserve size and crisis-response flexibility.”

In contrast, Arab Levant countries such as Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon enjoy relatively good local production, but not enough to cover the full “food basket” (wheat, oils, sugar). This leaves their budgets under severe pressure due to reliance on imports.

The disruption of Dubai’s Jebel Ali port, serving nearly 50 million people in the region, shifted the entire logistical burden to land routes through Saudi Arabia. Countries like Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain became effectively “land-locked,” now relying on a “land bridge” from Saudi Red Sea ports (Jeddah and Yanbu) across thousands of kilometers of desert highways. Redirecting ships to Jeddah instead of Dammam or Jubail added 1,200 km of refrigerated trucking, doubling logistics costs by 30% and causing vegetable and fruit prices in eastern Saudi Arabia to spike 200% in the first days of the crisis. ELZUBI notes that repeated shocks—from COVID-19 to the Ukraine war—have pushed the world to seek alternative supply chains, such as the “India–Middle East–Europe Corridor” or the Iraq–Turkey link. “These projects are no longer luxuries but necessities, since supply chain disruption not only raises prices but also threatens timely access to food.”

Another hidden dimension of the crisis is fertilizers. ELZUBI reminds that the Gulf produces nearly half the world’s urea (26 million tons out of 48), making any disruption in the region critical for global agriculture. “A $100 increase per ton raises the cost per hectare of wheat or corn by $20–30. With rising energy, shipping, and insurance costs, the pressure on importing countries’ budgets multiplies.”

This shock to agricultural inputs inevitably reduces crop yields in coming seasons and worsens challenges facing social safety nets. ELZUBI concludes with a warning: “Arab countries in conflict, reliant on humanitarian aid, are the most exposed. Rising prices threaten the ability of international agencies to secure funding, especially as donor states themselves face economic contraction.”