food security expert Dr. Fadel ELZUBI explained that the Food Security Council was established in 2023 under a special regulation, chaired by the Minister of Agriculture, to oversee the implementation of the National Food Security Strategy (2021–2030) and coordinate among stakeholders.

He added that in early 2025, the Council recommended amending its regulation to become the Higher Council for Food Security, chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Minister of Agriculture as deputy, and including all relevant ministries, the Armed Forces, the Department of Statistics, the Jordan Food and Drug Administration, and representatives of the private sector.

ELZUBI noted that the recommendations were not issued in a single document but rather accumulated through four council meetings, covering several axes:

• First axis: adoption of a detailed executive plan to translate the national strategy into a food security action plan for 2025–2027, with a matrix of projects and indicators.
• Second axis: building a national data system, including the launch of a National Food Security Information System to unify scattered indicators across institutions, based on documented statistical methodologies.
• Third axis: strengthening strategic reserves by increasing stocks of wheat, barley, and essential commodities, expanding storage capacity, and monitoring markets to prevent monopolies during regional crises.
• Fourth axis: supporting domestic production by purchasing wheat and barley from farmers at incentivizing prices, providing soft agricultural financing, and safeguarding plant genetic resources.
• Fifth axis: reducing food waste through a national campaign titled “No to Food Waste” within the action plan.

On implementation, ELZUBI stated that published evidence shows tangible progress on several fronts. The Council approved the 2025–2027 Food Security Action Plan, and the Prime Minister personally chaired meetings of the Higher Council in 2025 and 2026, signaling a clear political upgrade of the file.

He highlighted that the National Food Security Information System was launched in October 2024, comprising 36 national indicators, in cooperation with the Department of Statistics, FAO, and WFP. On reserves, data from the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply and the Grain Silos Company show wheat stocks at about 674,000 tons, with 300,000 tons contracted (covering around 10 months), barley stocks at 399,000 tons (covering nine months), and silo capacity at 750,000 tons, including 200,000 tons at Aqaba Port. In March 2026, the Higher Council confirmed that essential commodity reserves were “safe and sufficient for several months.”

Regarding local production, the Cabinet approved the purchase of wheat and barley from the 2025–2026 season, allocating JD 45 million for about 100–110 thousand tons, alongside a JD 10 million financing program at the Agricultural Credit Corporation (2025–2028), and the operation of the National Seed Bank.

At the results level, the SOFI 2026 report recorded improvements in Jordan’s indicators: undernourishment declined from 17.9% (2021–2023) to 14.3% (2022–2024), while the share of people unable to afford a healthy diet fell from 11.5% in 2023 to 10.7% in 2024 (from 1.3 to 1.2 million people). However, attributing these improvements directly to Council decisions requires impact analysis not yet published.

Challenges and Gaps ELZUBI pointed out that gaps remain, notably the absence of publicly available periodic monitoring reports for the 2025–2027 action plan, limiting accountability. Despite the launch of the national information system, policy papers from Foresight4Food (Oxford University and IFAD) highlight continued data fragmentation and limited transparency, undermining governance efficiency.

He noted that no annual public report titled “State of Food Security in Jordan” has been issued for 2023–2025, with only scattered indicators published by the Department of Statistics and international reports like SOFI. Similarly, the Regional Food Security Observatory for the Arab Mashreq, launched with FAO in December 2025, has yet to become operational, with official statements in April 2026 citing “challenges and the need for a clear timeline.”

ELZUBI also stressed that the Council has not published any study assessing the impact of the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz crisis (2026) on Jordan’s economy and food security, despite warnings from FAO and WFP about supply chain threats and fertilizer price hikes. Practical measures—such as banning exports of essential goods and arranging alternative ports—came from the Cabinet and other government channels, not the Council.

He added that operational weaknesses persist, with council meetings reduced to subcommittees attended by representatives lacking decision-making authority, limiting outputs to advisory recommendations. Food waste remains high—around 950,000 tons annually (30% of consumption)—with no documented impact from the national campaign. Structural reliance on imports also continues, as former Minister of Agriculture Khaled Hneifat stated that self-sufficiency in wheat would require about one billion cubic meters of water, which Jordan does not possess.

Assessment of Success ELZUBI concluded that success can be judged against four criteria:

1. Existence of approved implementation plans – achieved through the 2025–2027 plan.
2. Measurement and disclosure systems – partially achieved; the national system was launched, but no periodic or annual reports exist.
3. Impact on indicators and anticipatory analysis – indicators improved, but the Council failed to analyze the Gulf crisis.
4. Alignment of financing with commitments – not achieved, as published sources show gaps.

Overall, he described the progress as partial success: significant advances in reserves, data, and governance, but persistent challenges in transparency, anticipatory analysis, food waste, and structural import dependence.

ELZUBI emphasized that Jordan achieved a genuine institutional leap in food security between 2023–2026, establishing high-level governance, an executive plan, a national information system, and resilient reserves, alongside documented improvements in international indicators. Yet, full success remains premature, given the absence of annual reports, delays in the regional observatory, lack of analytical output during crises, weak representation of decision-makers in subcommittees, massive food waste figures, and limited domestic production due to water scarcity.

He concluded: “There has been notable progress in institutional building and preparedness, and partial success in execution, but the real test of sustainability remains open.”